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Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) refers to the process of a Pavlovian reward-
paired cue acquiring incentive motivational proprieties that drive choices. It represents a
crucial phenomenon for understanding cue-controlled behavior, and it has both adaptive
and maladaptive implications (i.e., drug-taking). In animals, individual differences in
the degree to which such cues bias performance have been identified in two
types of individuals that exhibit distinct Conditioned Responses (CR) during Pavlovian
conditioning: Sign-Trackers (ST) and Goal-Trackers (GT). Using an appetitive PIT
procedure with a monetary reward, the present study investigated, for the first time,
the extent to which such individual differences might affect the influence of reward-
paired cues in humans. In a first task, participants learned an instrumental response
leading to reward; then, in a second task, a visual Pavlovian cue was associated with
the same reward; finally, in a third task, PIT was tested by measuring the preference
for the reward-paired instrumental response when the task-irrelevant reward-paired cue
was presented, in the absence of the reward itself. In ST individuals, but not in GT
individuals, reward-related cues biased behavior, resulting in an increased likelihood to
perform the instrumental response independently paired with the same reward when
presented with the task-irrelevant reward-paired cue, even if the reward itself was no
longer available (i.e., stronger PIT effect). This finding has important implications for
developing individualized treatment for maladaptive behaviors, such as addiction.
Keywords: Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, cue-controlled behavior, Sign-Tracker, Goal-Tracker, reinforcement
learning
Introduction
Goal-directed behavior can be variably influenced by external and internal factors which impact
the values and priorities assigned to rewards and goals (Doya, 2008). One of the most simple and
effective mechanisms for influencing choice is reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning
allows animals to connect spatially and/or temporally related events in order to predict future
events. Given the complexity of the animal’s environment, learning that an arbitrary cue (e.g., a
sound) is predictive of a certain goal (e.g., obtain a reward, such as food), allows the animal to learn
a flexible response that facilitates achievement of the goal itself. In most cases such cue-controlled
behavior is adaptive; for example it helps one obtain food when hungry (Perks and Clifton, 1997;
Holmes et al., 2010). However, an inflexible association can lead to perseverance in the same choice
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even if the goal itself is no longer available, or has negative long-
term consequences (Holmes et al., 2010). For example, a cue
associated with drugs can induce relapse even when the drug
is not voluntary sought, and a sign associated with food can
induce craving in the absence of hunger, leading to compulsive
over-eating (Volkow et al., 2008). These biases on voluntary
choice are also implemented in marketing strategies, such as
advertisements, to influence consumer behavior (Smeets and
Barnes-Holmes, 2003; Bray et al., 2008; de Wit and Dickinson,
2009). Cue-controlled behaviors have been interpreted as the
endpoint of an initial intentional seeking behavior (of a reward),
which leads to habitual, and ultimately compulsive, conduct
characterized by a loss of control over behavior (Everitt and
Robbins, 2005). This interesting framework proposes that the
transition from intentional volition to habit and compulsion can
be explained by interactions between Pavlovian and instrumental
learning processes: a reward acts as an instrumental reinforcer
by enhancing actions that are able to produce it, while Pavlovian
learning confers incentive salience to cues (Conditioned Stimuli
or CS) closely associated with the reward (Everitt and Robbins,
2005). Such cues can elicit craving and motivation towards the
associated reward, thus biasing choice. Well-known evidence
of this effect can be found in the so-called Pavlovian-to-
Instrumental Transfer (PIT) effect (Estes, 1943, 1948). PIT
captures the ability of a Pavlovian cue (i.e., a CS associated
with a reward) to increase the likelihood of an instrumental
response independently paired with the same (specific-PIT), or
a similar (general-PIT), reward (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967;
de Wit and Dickinson, 2009; Holmes et al., 2010). This effect
emerges without any formal association between Pavlovian and
instrumental contingencies, and even when the reward itself is no
longer available (Talmi et al., 2008). PIT has been mainly studied
in non-human animals (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Lovibond,
1981; Colwill and Rescorla, 1988; Balleine, 1994; Rescorla, 1994a,
1997, 2000; Delamater, 1995, 1996; Holland et al., 2002; Corbit
and Balleine, 2003; Holland and Gallagher, 2003; Holland, 2004;
Delamater and Holland, 2008; for review, see Dickinson and
Balleine, 1994, 2002; Holmes et al., 2010), but some recent studies
have also reported this effect in humans (Paredes-Olay et al.,
2002; Hogarth et al., 2007, 2010, 2013a,b; Bray et al., 2008; Allman
et al., 2010; Nadler et al., 2011; Prévost et al., 2012; Lovibond and
Colagiuri, 2013).
An important, but still neglected, aspect in the human
literature about PIT concerns individual differences. In the
animal literature, the extent to which a Pavlovian cue becomes
attractive and exerts a biasing effect varies between individuals.
In particular, Sign-Trackers (ST) and Goal-Trackers (GT) have
been shown to have different learning styles, consisting of a
tendency to attribute more or less incentive salience to Pavlovian
reward-associated cues. In a typical Pavlovian conditioning
paradigm, a CS (e.g., lever presentation) is paired with a reward
(e.g., food pellet), which is delivered in a different spatial position.
In such a situation, two different Conditioned Responses (CR;
i.e., learned responses to a previously neutral stimulus) might be
expressed. Some animals approach and engage the CS (the Sign)
itself and, only after its termination, reach the location of reward
delivery; other animals, upon CS presentation, immediately
engage the location of reward delivery (the Goal), even if it is not
yet available. The first CR has been categorized as Sign-Tracking
behavior, while the second CR has been categorized as Goal-
Tracking behavior. ST and GT can be conceived of as different
learning styles, expressed through a specific CR during Pavlovian
learning. ST behavior is thought to arise from the attribution
of incentive salience to Pavlovian reward-paired cues, which
consequently become a powerful source of motivation for future
behavior (Flagel et al., 2011). In ST, incentive stimuli become
attractive, eliciting approach towards them and promoting
potentially maladaptive cue-controlled behaviors; ST individuals,
indeed, are generally more vulnerable to addiction and relapse
(Tomie et al., 1998; Flagel et al., 2008; Robinson and Flagel, 2009).
The ST and GT profiles do not seem to be limited to the CR
expressed, but are also associated with differences in traits such
as impulsivity; ST individuals are characterized by higher levels
of impulsive behavior compared to GT individuals (Tomie et al.,
2000; Flagel et al., 2009).
A deeper investigation into individual differences in
attributing incentive salience to reward-paired stimuli would
thus be important for understanding and reducing the propensity
to develop maladaptive behaviors.
The aim of the present study was to investigate individual
differences in human PIT. Specifically, the present study
explored, for the first time in humans, whether individual
differences in the propensity to approach and engage a Sign
(cue-predicting reward) or a Goal (reward) are predictive of
cue-controlled behavior. To this end, a typical PIT experimental
design was used, comprising three tasks. In the first phase,
participants performed an Instrumental Conditioning task, in
which they were presented with two possible choices, one
paired with an actual monetary win (Rewarded Choice) and
the other paired with a neutral outcome (Unrewarded Choice).
In a subsequent session, participants performed a Pavlovian
Conditioning task, during which they learned to associate a
specific visual cue with an actual monetary win (CS+), and
another visual cue with a neutral outcome (CS−). During
this phase, eye-movements were recorded and subsequently
analyzed in order to identify the expressed CR and characterize
participants as ST or GT. Mirroring previous studies conducted
in animals (Boakes, 1977; Flagel et al., 2007, 2008, 2011;
Saunders and Robinson, 2013), in which the CR is identified
based on the amount of approaching behavior expressed
during CS presentation, in the present study ST and GT
participants were distinguished based on a learned oculomotor
CR. Specifically, it was measured the tendency to direct
contiguous eye-gazes toward the location where the visual
CS (Sign) or the reward (Goal) would be presented. Finally,
PIT was tested in an extinction phase (without any rewards),
during which participants had to choose between the same
two options given during instrumental conditioning, while
presented with the task-irrelevant CS. In this final phase, PIT
would be observed if presentation of the CS+, compared to the
CS−, enhanced instrumental responses to the choice rewarded
during instrumental conditioning (Congruent Choice), relative
to the previously unrewarded choice (Incongruent Choice). If
consistent with animal literature, this effect should be stronger
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 163
Garofalo and di Pellegrino Individual differences in human cue-controlled behavior
in ST individuals than in GT individuals, possibly indicating a
stronger biasing effect of Pavlovian cues over behavior in the first
group relative to the second.
Method
Participants
Forty-five volunteers (27 female; 2 left-handed; mean age = 24.87,
sd = 2.5; mean education = 17.53, sd = 1.5) with no history of
neurological diseases were recruited from the student population
at the University of Bologna. All participants gave written
informed consent to take part in the experiment and received
payment corresponding to the amount earned during the tasks.
The study was conducted in accordance with institutional
guidelines and the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. It was approved
by the Ethics Committee for Psychological Research at the
University of Bologna.
Stimuli and Procedure
The whole experiment consisted of three tasks. The same visual
background was used in all three tasks. Four black squares
(4 cm2) were displayed on a 17-inch color monitor with a
black background. The squares were highlighted by a white
frame and positioned as follows: top center, bottom center,
right center, left center. Two black-and-white fractal images
(balanced for luminance, complexity and color saturation) were
used as Pavlovian cues (CS) and presented within the top
center square. An image of a 10 euro cent coin was used
as the reward, and a light-yellow circle (equally sized) was
used as the neutral outcome (no-reward). Both these visual
cues appeared within the bottom center square (Figure 1).
A computer running Presentation software (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Albany, CA, USA) controlled stimulus presentation. On
arrival, participants were comfortably seated in a silent room and
their position was centered relative to the screen, at a viewing
distance of 60 cm from the eye-tracker and 75 cm from the
screen. The eye-tracker was positioned under the screen, and
was centered relative to both the screen and the participant. Eye-
movements and behavioral responses were collected throughout
the experiment and stored for offline analysis. Participants
were asked to remain as still as possible to avoid confounding
effects on eye-movements. The whole experiment was conducted
in a dark room to facilitate eye-movement recording. The
experimental session began with calibration of the eye-tracker
device, during which the participant fixated nine specific points
on the computer screen. The experimental session followed the
standard paradigm for testing PIT. It was composed of three tasks
administered in succession: an Instrumental Conditioning task,
in which participants learned a response-contingent reward; a
Pavlovian Conditioning task, in which participants learned a cue-
contingent reward; and a PIT task, during which the influence
of irrelevant Pavlovian cues on instrumental responding was
tested. In each task, participants were required to pay attention
to the screen and follow the instructions reported at the
beginning of the task. A few example trials were always
performed and, if necessary, further clarifications were given
before beginning each task. At the end of the experimental
FIGURE 1 | Graphical illustration of the three tasks: Instrumental
Conditioning Task (Panel A), Pavlovian Conditioning Task (Panel B);
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) Task (Panel C).
session, participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995). Previous studies on animals reported
an association between Sign-Tracking behavior and reduced
impulse control (Flagel et al., 2011). Thus, this measure allowed
further investigation into the differences between ST and GT
individuals.
Instrumental Conditioning Task
Participants were instructed to choose between two squares to
gain a reward. One square was paired with an actual monetary
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 163
Garofalo and di Pellegrino Individual differences in human cue-controlled behavior
win (Rewarded Choice), while the other was paired with a neutral
outcome (Unrewarded Choice). The right and left squares were
presented in white and indicated as possible choices to be
selected by a mouse click. The mouse pointer was centrally
positioned before each choice, in order to not encourage a
specific choice. Only one square was associated with a reward
following a partial reinforcement schedule, so that between
one reward and the next a variable interval between 4 and
12 s was always associated with no-reward. After each choice,
a corresponding neutral image (light-yellow circle) or reward
image (10 euro cents coin) appeared for 1 s in the bottom square
(Figure 1A). Participants were aware that they would receive an
actual payment corresponding to the amount of coins collected
during the task. The association between square and outcome
was counterbalanced across subjects. The rationale of this task
was to make participants learn an association between a specific
response (left or right square) and the reward; thus, participants
would get a higher frequency of Rewarded Choices if they learned
the correct association. The task lasted about 6min, during which
subjects were free to perform as many choices as they wished,
with no time pressure.
Pavlovian Conditioning Task
In each trial, one of two possible visual cues (fractal images)
appeared for 5 s within the top square, followed by a white
patch within the bottom square. Upon presentation of the patch,
participants were instructed to press the left-Ctrl button on
the keyboard as quickly as possible to remove the patch and
discover the outcome hidden below. To perform this button
press, participants did not need to remove their gaze from the
screen. The outcome was then presented for 1 s. One fractal was
associated with a reward (10 euro cent coin) on 80% of trials
(CS+), while the other fractal was associated with no-reward
(light-yellow circle) on all trials (CS−; Figure 1B). The task
consisted of 40 trials (20 per condition) with a variable inter-trial-
interval between 0.5 and 4 s. Participants were aware that they
would receive an actual payment corresponding to the amount
of coins collected during the task. The association between visual
cue and outcomewas counterbalanced across subjects. The whole
task lasted around 6 min.
The Pavlovian speeded reaction time response described
above (‘‘press the button upon patch presentation’’) has been
successfully used in previous studies Talmi et al. (2008) and
was introduced to obtain a behavioral measure of Pavlovian
conditioning. The main reason for using a speeded response
was to mirror PIT studies on animals, in which Pavlovian
conditioning is measured by a behavior performed to gain the
reward (e.g., latency of the first nose-poke or frequency of nose-
pokes; Dickinson et al., 2000; Holland, 2004; Corbit and Balleine,
2005). The rationale here is to observe a faster reaction times
when a reward was predicted (CS+ condition) than when a
neutral outcome was predicted (CS− condition). To avoid a
possible instrumental influence on the task, participants were
explicitly told that, in this task, the reward was not contingent
on their response. It was demonstrated that, if no answer was
given, the patch would disappear anyway after 1.5 s, revealing
the outcome. Importantly, this speeded reaction time response
allowed us to obtain a measure of the learning rate that is
independent from ST/GT behavior.
To identify ST and GT CR, eye-movements were recorded
in order to evaluate contiguous eye-gazes directed toward
the ‘‘Sign’’ (top center square) and the ‘‘Goal’’ (bottom
center square). Mirroring animal studies, these two CR were
subsequently used to distinguish participants as ST or GT,
depending on the tendency to direct eye-gaze toward the Sign
or the Goal during the 5 s of CS presentation (Flagel et al., 2011).
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) Task
Participants received exactly the same instructions as in the
Instrumental Conditioning phase requiring them to choose
between the right and left white squares. The task was identical
to the Instrumental Conditioning task, except in two aspects:
first, the task-irrelevant Pavlovian CSwere presented sequentially
within the top square, changing every 30 s, the task was
completely performed in extinction, so all choices always lead
to no-reward. (Figure 1C). Extinction is a standard procedure
for assessing PIT, both in human and animal research, since it
allows one to test the influence of Pavlovian cues on instrumental
responding without the confounding effects of the reward
(Rescorla, 1994a,b; Corbit et al., 2001; Bray et al., 2008; Talmi
et al., 2008). Indeed, the rationale here is to test the ability of
a task-irrelevant Pavlovian cue to drive choices (presumably,
towards the response previously associated with a reward) even if
the reward is not available anymore. The PIT task lasted about 6
min, during which subjects were free to perform as many choices
as they wished, with no time pressure.
Eye Tracking
Eye movements were recorded in a dimly lit room using a
Pan/Tilt optic eye-tracker (Eye-Track ASL-6000) which registers
real-time gaze at 50 Hz. Data acquired during the Pavlovian
Conditioning task were analyzed offline using EyeNal Analysis
Software (ASL). Dwell time during the 5 s of CS presentation was
then measured for two specific areas of interest (AOI): ‘‘Sign’’,
corresponding to the 4 cm square at the top center, plus a 1 cm
margin; ‘‘Goal’’, corresponding to the 4 cm square at the bottom
center, plus a 1 cmmargin. Dwell time was defined as the amount
of time during which a series of contiguous fixations remained
within the same AOI.
Sign-Tracker and Goal-Tracker Categorization
Participants were categorized as ST or GT based on the
oculomotor CR expressed during the Pavlovian Conditioning
task. Previous studies used approaching and engaging behaviors
during Pavlovian Conditioning to identify ST and GT. In these
studies, the numbers of contacts with the Sign (i.e., lever)
and the Goal (i.e., food tray) were compared to obtain an
index of behavior, and divide the subjects into ST (i.e., high
probability to engage the lever) and GT (i.e., high probability
to engage the food-tray) individuals (Flagel et al., 2007, 2008,
2011; Robinson and Flagel, 2009; Saunders and Robinson, 2013;
Robinson et al., 2014). This method was adapted in the present
experiment by calculating contiguous eye-gazes (Dwell Time)
toward the cue (Sign) and the reward (Goal) AOI, during CS
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presentation (see above). ST behavior has been defined as a
CR to approach and engage ‘‘the cue or sign that indicates
impending reward delivery’’; while GT behavior has been defined
as a tendency to ‘‘engage the location of unconditioned cue
delivery, even though it is not available until conditioned cue
termination’’ (Flagel et al., 2011). Thus, a learned oculomotor
CR towards the location of the Sign or the Goal is a practical
method for distinguishing between ST and GT individuals. On
this basis, an eye-gaze index was created based on the Dwell
Time spent on the Sign and Goal locations. An individual
dwell is defined as the time period during which a fixation
or series of temporally contiguous fixations remain within an
AOI. That is, an individual dwell is defined as the sum of
the durations across all fixations within the current AOI, from
entry to exit. To compute fixations, EyeNal ASL was used,
which defines a fixation if the observer’ s gaze position remains
within a diameter of 0, 5◦ of visual angle for at least 120 ms
(six consecutive samples, at 50 Hz sampling rate; Eye-Analysis
software Manual, v. 1.41, Applied Science Laboratories, 2007).
The Dwell Time spent on the Sign and Goal locations was
calculated for each trial and then averaged for each participant.
The eye-gaze index was calculated as the difference between the
Dwell Time on Sign minus the Dwell Time on Goal over the
total Dwell Time (Sign − Goal/Sign + Goal), so that a higher
value corresponded to a higher Dwell Time toward the Sign
(Sign-Tracking behavior) and a lower value corresponded to a
higher Dwell Time toward the Goal (Goal-Tracking behavior).
Since the interest here was to disentangle two reward-specific
CR, only CS+ trials in the second half of the task were
considered, when contingency learning was more established.
Based on this index, the top and bottom 50% of the total
sample were categorized as ST (eye-gaze index between 0.38
and 1.00) and GT (eye-gaze index between −1.00 and 0.27),
respectively.
Results
ST and GT CR
To ensure that the oculomotor responses used to categorize
ST and GT individuals were learned CRs, eye-gaze indices
were separately analyzed for CS+ and CS− trials in the
first and second halves of the Pavlovian Conditioning task.
Two separate mixed-effects models with Group (ST/GT) and
Hemiblock (1/2) as independent variables were performed for
CS+ and CS− conditions. The eye-gaze index described above
was the dependent variable. Subjects were modeled as a random
effect. Assumptions of normal distribution, independence of
residuals and sphericity were verified. Results from CS+ trials
showed a significant interaction effect (F(1,42) = 14.75; two-
tailed p = 0.0004; part. η2 = 0.26). Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
tests revealed a significant difference (p = 0.003) between ST
(mean = 0.35; sd = 0.77) and GT (mean =−0.06; sd = 0.79) in the
second Hemiblock (Figure 2A). No other post hoc comparisons
were significant (ps > 0.15). Results from CS− trials did not
show any significant effects (ps > 0.05; Figure 2B). Overall,
these results indicate two important points: first, a bias toward
either the Sign or the Goal is a learned CR, since it is not
FIGURE 2 | Oculomotor response. (Panels A and B) show the eye-gaze
index in the two groups (ST = Sign-Trackers; GT = Goal-Trackers) and the two
task hemiblocks. (Panel A) represents CS+ trails and (Panel B) represents
CS− trials. (Panels C and D) show the eye-gaze index in the two conditions
(CS+ = reward-associated cue; CS− = neutral cue) in ST and GT, respectively.
(Panel E) shows visual exploratory behavior in the two groups
(ST = Sign-Trackers; GT = Goal-Trackers) throughout the task. Bars indicate
standard error of the mean. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
present at the beginning of the task but emerges later in time,
when contingencies have been learned (Figure 2A); moreover,
this looking bias is specific to the reward-paired cue (CS+),
as no differences were observed for the unpaired cue (CS−;
Figure 2B). In Figure 2A it is evident how, at the beginning
of the Pavlovian task, during CS+ presentation, no tendency
seems evident, while, towards the end ST show higher Dwell
Time towards the Sign (eye-gaze index increases) while GT
show higher Dwell Time towards the Goal (eye-gaze index
decreases). Figure 2B, on the other hand, shows that the same
pattern is not observable during the presentation of the neutral
stimulus (CS−).
To further test that this behavior is a reward-specific CR, the
eye gaze index was also directly compared between CS+ and
CS− trials from the second hemiblock (when contingencies had
been learned) within each group. Two separate paired t-tests
were performed for the ST and GT groups, using Condition
(CS+/CS−) as the independent variable and the eye-gaze index
as the dependent variable. In both groups a significant difference
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between the two conditions was found. The ST group showed
a significantly higher eye-gaze index in the CS+ condition than
in the CS− condition (t(21) = 1.69; one-tailed p = 0.03; Cohen’s
d = 0.19), indicating a greater tendency to direct contiguous
eye-gazes towards the Sign during CS+ trials than during CS−
trials (Figure 2C). The GT group showed a significantly lower
eye-gaze index in the CS+ condition than in the CS− condition
(t(21) = 2.21; one-tailed p = 0.01; Cohen’s d = 0.24), indicating a
greater tendency to direct contiguous eye-gazes towards the Goal
during CS+ trials than during CS− trials (Figure 2D).
Given the specific spatial locations of the Sign and the Goal
in the present paradigm, visual exploratory behavior was also
considered by analyzing the total dwell time spent on the top
and the bottom portions of the screen, in order to exclude the
presence of a spatial bias that could account for ST and GT
behavior. A mixed-effects model was used, with Group (ST/GT)
and AOI (Top/Bottom) as independent variables and Total Dwell
Time as dependent variable. Subjects were modeled as a random
effect. Assumptions of normal distribution, independence of
residuals and sphericity were verified. Results showed a marginal
main effect of AOI (F(1,42) = 4.01; two-tailed p = 0.05; part.
η2 = 0.09), with more Dwell Time spent on the Top of the screen
(mean = 0.76; sd = 0.91) than on the Bottom (mean = 0.41;
sd = 0.64) in both groups (Figure 2E). Neither group differences,
nor interaction effects emerged (ps > 0.87). These results
strengthen the evidence that the behavioral differences observed
between ST and GT cannot be ascribed to a mere spatial bias
towards the upper or the lower part of the screen. The general
difference in time spent looking at the Top and the Bottom
of the screen is compatible with the fact that dwell time was
calculated during the 5 s of CS presentation. These results thus
indicate that both groups spent more time visually exploring
the region of the screen where a stimulus was being presented
(Top), rather than where there was no stimulus (Bottom). No
difference in this spatial bias was found between the two groups
(Figure 2E).
Taken together, the last two analyses demonstrated that group
differences in the tendency to direct contiguous eye-gazes to the
location of the Sign or the Goal cannot be ascribed to a mere
spatial bias, but rather reflect a learned reward-related CR.
Instrumental Conditioning
To ensure that instrumental conditioning was successful in both
the ST and the GT groups, so that all participants learned
which response leads to a reward, the number of choices
(mouse clicks) made on the two white squares were compared.
Choosing the square associated with reward was considered
a Rewarded Choice, and choosing the square associated with
no-reward was considered an Unrewarded Choice. A mixed-
effects model was used, with Choice (Rewarded/Unrewarded)
and Group (ST/GT) as independent variables and the number
of choices as the dependent variable. Subjects were modeled
as a random effect. Assumptions of normal distribution,
independence of residuals and sphericity were verified. Results
showed a main effect of Choice (F(1,42) = 20.88; two-tailed p <
0.0001; part η2 = 0.33), with Rewarded Choices (mean = 32.80;
sd = 9.38) occurring more frequently than Unrewarded Choices
FIGURE 3 | Learning rates in the two groups (ST = Sign-Trackers;
GT = Goal-Trackers) during Instrumental Conditioning (Panel A) and
Pavlovian Conditioning (Panel B). Bars indicate standard error of the mean.
***p < 0.001.
(mean = 22.09; sd = 9.10; Figure 3A). Neither group differences,
nor interaction effects emerged (ps > 0.55). These results
indicate that the ST and GT groups learned to discriminate
between the rewarding and non-rewarding choices equally
well.
Pavlovian Conditioning
To ensure that Pavlovian learning occurred in both ST and GT
groups, reaction times to patch presentation were analyzed. If
participants correctly learned to discriminate between the two
Pavlovian cues, faster reaction times should be observed for CS+
trials relative to CS− trials. A mixed-effects model was used,
with Condition (CS+/CS−) and Group (ST/GT) as independent
variables, and reaction times as the dependent variable. Subjects
were modeled as a random effect. Assumptions of normal
distribution, independence of residuals and sphericity were
verified. Results showed a significant main effect of Condition
(F(1,842) = 110.24; two-tailed p = 0.0001; part. η2 = 0.72),
with faster reaction times for CS+ trials (mean = 306.33;
sd = 44.41) relative to CS− trials (mean = 351.21; sd = 50.05;
Figure 3B). Neither group differences, nor interaction effects
emerged (ps > 0.29). These results indicate that participants
generally reacted more quickly to the patch on trials with
the reward-paired cue (CS+) than on trials with the unpaired
cue (CS−). This reward-specific response facilitation indicates
successful Pavlovian conditioning in both ST and GT.
Pavlovian-to Instrumental Transfer
To test for PIT, the numbers of Congruent choices (associated
with the reward during Instrumental Conditioning) and
Incongruent choices (associated with no-reward during
Instrumental Conditioning) during CS+ and CS− presentation
were compared. A response index was calculated as the
probability of selecting the Congruent choice minus the
probability of selecting the Incongruent choice (number of
congruent—incongruent choices/total number of choices).
Higher values correspond to a higher probability of making
the Congruent choice, while lower values correspond to
a higher probability of making the Incongruent choice. A
mixed-effects model was used, with Condition (CS+/CS−) and
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FIGURE 4 | Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT). (Panel A) shows
the response index (Congruent-Incongruent/Total) in the two groups
(ST = Sign-Trackers; GT = Goal-Trackers) during CS− and CS+ trials. (Panels
B and C) show the response index over time by dividing the task into three
blocks of two trials. (Panels D and E) show the number of responses. Bars
indicate standard error of the mean. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
Group (ST/GT) as independent variables and the response
index, described above, as the dependent variable. Subjects
were modeled as a random effect. Assumptions of normal
distribution, independence of residuals and sphericity were
verified. Results showed a significant Condition × Group
interaction (F(1,42) = 8.22; two-tailed p = 0.006; part. η2 = 0.16).
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons revealed a significant
difference (p = 0.001) between CS+ (mean = 0.18; sd = 0.12) and
CS− (mean = 0.04; sd = 0.13) only in ST group, and a significant
difference (p = 0.04) between ST (mean = 0.18; sd = 0.12) and
GT (mean = 0.08; sd = 0.12) during CS+ (Figure 4A). No other
comparisons were significant (ps > 0.13). These results indicate
that the ST group was more likely to choose the congruent
option when they saw the task-irrelevant CS+ than when they
saw the CS−. thus revealing a PIT effect. Critically, this bias was
stronger in ST than in GT individuals.
While the first analysis on PIT focused on the overall effect,
a second analysis divided the task into three equal blocks of
2 min (four trials) to check for differences in task performance
over time. A mixed-effects model was used, with Condition
(CS+/CS−), Group (ST/GT) and Block (1/2/3) as independent
variables, and the response index as the dependent variable.
Subjects were modeled as a random effect. Assumptions of
normal distribution, independence of residuals and sphericity
were verified. Results showed a significant main effect of
Condition (F(1,42) = 6.39; two-tailed p = 0.02; part. η2 = 0.13), a
significant Condition × Group interaction (F(1,42) = 7.69; two-
tailed p = 0.008; part. η2 = 0.15), and a significant Block ×
Group interaction (F(1.27,53.32) = 50.61; two-tailed p < 0.001;
part. η2 = 0.5; Figures 4B,C). Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests
on the Condition × Group interaction revealed a significant
difference (p = 0.003) between CS+ and CS− in ST group but
not the GT group, and a significant difference (p = 0.02) between
ST and GT groups in CS+ trials (Figures 4B,C). Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc tests on the Block × Group interaction
revealed a significant difference (p< 0.0001) between ST and GT
groups in the third block, but not in the first and second blocks
(Figures 4B,C). Figures 4D,E show the number of responses.
In line with the results of the first analysis, these results
showed that, unlike GT, ST group was more likely to choose the
congruent option when they saw the task-irrelevant CS+ than
when they saw the CS−, throughout the entire PIT task. The only
effect of time revealed by this analysis was in the last block, where
a group difference in responses emerged. Since this difference
was unrelated to the displayed stimulus (CS+/CS−), it does not
constitute a difference in PIT. This result instead indicates that
the ST and GT groups differed in the proportion of congruent
choice made towards the end of the task.
Impulsiveness
To further investigate differences between ST and GT
individuals, self-reported impulsiveness, as rated by the BIS-11
questionnaire (Patton et al., 1995), was compared between the
two groups. A two-sample t-test was performed using Group
(ST/GT) as the independent variable and BIS-11 scores as the
dependent variable. Results revealed a significant difference
between the two groups (t(28.75) = 2.06; two-sided p = 0.04,
with the ST group (mean = 61.0; sd = 9.91) showing higher
impulsiveness than the GT group (mean = 54.09; sd = 8.86;
Figure 5). This finding is consistent with previous studies
showing significantly higher levels of impulsiveness as compared
to GT (Tomie et al., 2000; Flagel et al., 2009).
FIGURE 5 | Impulsiveness levels in the two groups (ST = Sign-Trackers;
GT = Goal-Trackers) as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS-11). Bars indicate standard error of the mean. *p < 0.05.
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Discussion
Motivated behavior is characterized by a wide span of inter-
individual differences in both human and non-human animals.
In the present study, the PIT paradigm was used to examine
individual differences in the excitatory influence that signals
associated with reward can exert on human choices. PIT is
a well-known procedure for testing the ability of a Pavlovian
reward-paired cue to acquire incentive motivational properties
and influence instrumental performance (Estes, 1943, 1948;
Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009;
Holmes et al., 2010). Here, participants performed a standard
PIT paradigm composed of three tasks: an Instrumental
Conditioning task, during which response-outcome associations
were learned; a Pavlovian Conditioning task, during which
stimulus-outcome associations were leaned; and a PIT task,
in which the ability of a Pavlovian cue to drive instrumental
responses was tested. Individual differences were characterized
by two distinct oculomotor CR exhibited during Pavlovian
Conditioning, corresponding to two different learning styles
previously identified and described in animal literature: Sign-
Tracking (ST) and Goal-Tracking (GT; Estes, 1943, 1948; Boakes,
1977; Flagel et al., 2011). In the present study, ST behavior
consisted of a tendency to direct contiguous eye-gazes towards
the cue (CS) that indicated impending reward delivery (Sign);
in contrast, GT behavior was characterized by a tendency to
direct contiguous eye-gazes towards the location of reward (US)
delivery (Goal), even if not available until CS termination.
An eye-gaze index was based on the emergence of these two
behavioral patterns during presentation of the reward-paired
stimulus (CS+) in the second half of the task (when contingencies
had been learned), and a median split was used to categorize
participants as ST or GT. Importantly, the present results
demonstrate that this oculomotor CR was: (i) acquired over
time (i.e., learned), since a specific CR towards the Sign or the
Goal only emerged towards the end of the task, when stimulus-
reward associations had been acquired selectively during the
presentation of reward-paired cues (CS+; Figures 2A,B); and
(ii) reward specific, since the CR was only evident when
participants saw the reward-related cue (CS+) and not when
they saw the neutral cue (CS−; Figures 2C,D). Coherently with
what expected, the task-irrelevant CS had a much stronger
influence on the ST group than on the GT group during the
PIT task.
Group differences in the PIT effect are not attributable to
differences in the strength of Instrumental or Pavlovian learning
between the groups, which could have potentially induced a bias
towards the rewarded choice in the Instrumental Conditioning
task, or a stronger influence of the reward-paired cue in
the second Pavlovian Conditioning task. Analyses of both the
number of rewarded choices during Instrumental Conditioning,
and reaction times during Pavlovian Conditioning, exclude
such a possibility by revealing that both the ST and GT
groups learned the response-outcome and stimulus-outcome
contingencies equally well (Figure 3). Consequently, differences
in the PIT effect cannot be explained by group differences in
the ability to learn either the instrumental or the Pavlovian
contingencies. In line with the animal literature (Robinson and
Flagel, 2009), the Pavlovian cue (CS+) was clearly predictive of
reward, since it elicited faster reaction times during Pavlovian
conditioning than the neutral stimulus (CS−) did in both groups,
along with a CR corresponding to the behavioral profile of each
group (ST/GT).
Since the ‘‘Sign’’ and the ‘‘Goal’’ had specific spatial locations
(the top and bottom portions of the screen, respectively), it is
important to rule out the possibility that spatial biases in gaze
direction might account for the difference in the PIT effect
between groups. A bias towards looking at the top of the screen
might cause result in a stronger influence of the Sign on the ST
group just because they spent more time looking at it. Analysis
of visual exploratory behavior during Pavlovian Conditioning,
however, revealed that the ST and GT groups did not differ in
the total amount of time spent looking at the top and bottom
of the screen (Figure 2E). Critically, behavioral differences only
emerged during CS+ trials towards the end of the task, once the
association between the cue and the reward had been learned.
Consequently, it is concluded that there was no a priori bias in
gaze direction; rather, such a bias emerged during the Pavlovian
Conditioning task as a learned reward-specific CR.
Moreover, a recent study (Trick et al., 2011) directly
investigated the relation between fixation times during Pavlovian
learning and the PIT effect. The authors found that fixation
times during Pavlovian learning increased with uncertainty
(that is, more attention was paid to stimuli with uncertain
outcome probabilities, e.g., 50%, than to stimuli with more
certain outcome probabilities, e.g., 90%). In contrast, the PIT
effect increased with the probability of reward (that is, it
was stronger for stimuli associated with a high probability of
reward, e.g., 90%, than for stimuli associated with uncertain
outcomes, e.g., 50%, or a low probability of reward, e.g.,
10%). Thus, Trick et al. (2011) concluded that the behavioral
influence exerted by CS (i.e., the PIT effect) is dissociated
from attention to Pavlovian stimuli in humans, (see Kaye and
Pearce, 1984, for similar findings in animals). Instead, PIT
is linked to the predictive value acquired by stimuli during
learning.
ST behavior has been explained as a consequence of
attributing incentive salience to reward-paired cues (Pavlovian
CS), arising from the interaction between previous experience
(reinforcement learning processes) and individual propensities
(Berridge, 2001; Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Flagel et al., 2011).
This incentive salience motivates reward-related action (Tomie
et al., 2000; Flagel et al., 2008; Robinson and Flagel, 2009). In the
present study, ST and GT groups differed in the extent to which
Pavlovian reward-paired cues biased their behavior: relative to
the GT group, the ST group showed an increased likelihood of
performing the instrumental response independently paired with
the same reward when presented with the task-irrelevant reward-
paired cue, even if the reward itself was no longer available
(i.e., a stronger PIT effect; Figure 4A). Therefore, reward-paired
cues exerted a stronger source of influence on the behavior of
ST individuals, as predicted. Importantly, time course analysis
revealed that this effect occurred early and remained stable
throughout the entire PIT test session (Figures 4B,C), thereby
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suggesting that the group difference in the PIT effect most likely
reflects greater incentive salience to reward cues in ST than in
GT individuals. A group difference in the overall amount of
congruent responses (during both CS+ and CS− presentation,
thus not reflecting PIT) emerged towards the end of the task
(Figures 4B,C).
Previous studies have found an association between ST
behavior and other traits, such as higher levels of behavioral
impulsivity and a greater propensity to develop addiction (Tomie
et al., 1998; Flagel et al., 2008; Robinson and Flagel, 2009). In
line with these studies, the present study found reduced self-
reported impulse control in the ST group than in the GT group
(Figure 5). These findings seem to corroborate the idea that ST
and GT behaviors are just one expression of a broader profile of
individual differences, which might be clinically relevant. Many
studies have reported that ST individuals are more impulsive
and prone to develop potentially maladaptive behaviors, such
as addiction (Tomie et al., 1998; Robinson and Flagel, 2009;
Flagel et al., 2011). For example, the propensity to sign-track is
associated with a stronger effect of psychomotor sensitization,
a higher susceptibility to a form of cocaine-induced plasticity
that may contribute to the development of addiction (Flagel
et al., 2008). Furthermore, ST behavior in relation to a specific
Pavlovian cue (i.e., a cue predicting monetary reward) is also
predictive of the propensity to attribute incentive salience to
other reward-paired cues, such as food-related or drug-related
cues (e.g., cocaine and alcohol; Uslaner et al., 2006; Cunningham
and Patel, 2007; Flagel et al., 2008; Clark et al., 2013). The extent
to which such individual differences might play a role in the
development of addiction and in the propensity to relapse is
not yet clear, but their implications for developing individually
targeted treatment programs are promising.
It should be noted that some recent studies highlighted amore
complex scenario relating ST and GT behaviors to addiction.
While ST individuals are more susceptible to the influence of
discrete cues, GT individuals are more influenced by contextual
cues, which can motivate drug-seeking behavior (Robinson
et al., 2014). Consequently, these learning styles seem to reflect
differences in the kinds of triggers to which the individual is
susceptible (e.g., discrete/contextual), rather than a propensity to
addiction per se. This finding emphasizes that there are diverse
pathways to addiction, and has remarkable implications for the
development of personalized treatments in the future.
But what exactly is the mechanism underlying the attribution
of incentive salience to discrete stimuli, such as Pavlovian cues?
A large amount of evidence points to the role of dopaminergic
transmission within circuits known to be involved in addiction.
The core of the nucleus accumbens, for example, was reported
to be involved in ST behavior, and mediates the reinstatement
of drug-seeking and drug-taking behavior (Flagel et al., 2007,
2008, 2011; Clark et al., 2013). Furthermore, various studies have
supported the involvement of the mesolimbic dopamine system
in the emergence of ST behavior. ST individuals are characterized
by stronger dopaminergic gene expression and increased levels
of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens (correlated with the vigor
with which the CR is performed; Flagel et al., 2007, 2008). Even
if differences in basic dopaminergic levels cannot fully account
for differences in dopamine responsiveness, it has been argued
that higher reward-related dopamine release before conditioning
might increase attribution of incentive salience to reward-related
cues (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000, 2001). Additionally, Flagel et al.
(2011) directly demonstrated that dopaminergic transmission is
not involved in all forms of learning, but it is necessary for
the acquisition of a sign-tracking CR, playing a crucial role
in the assignment of incentive salience to reward-related cues.
The same study also showed that dopaminergic prediction-error
signals, coded by activity in the nucleus accumbens, are present in
ST individuals, but not in GT individuals. In the present study, a
similar mechanism might occur: high levels of dopamine release
might boost attribution of incentive salience to reward-related
cues, increasing their ability to motivate and drive behavior.
Future studies might further investigate individual differences
in the influence of Pavlovian cues on behavior by taking
additional measures into account, such as phasic dopamine
levels, psychophysiological indices (e.g., galvanic skin response
and heart rate) and as neuroimaging measurements. These
methods would allow better comparisons between human and
non-human animal research on individual differences in ST/GT
behavior and learning styles. A general limitation in the standard
PIT paradigm is that the ‘‘Sign’’ and the ‘‘Goal’’ are presented
in distinct spatial locations. Thus, unrelated spatial biases in
gaze direction might obscure the effect of interest. Although
the analysis conducted in this study already confirmed that
the present findings cannot be accounted for by any a priori
difference in spatial bias between groups, another way to control
for this possibility would be to replicate the experiment with the
spatial positions of the ‘‘Sign’’ and the ‘‘Goal’’ inverted in the
three tasks.
In conclusion, the individual differences demonstrated here
offer a promising direction for further investigating the degree
to which incentive salience is attributed to environmental
stimuli associated with rewards, as well as the link between
this process and maladaptive behaviors, ranging from over-
eating to pathological gambling and addiction (Saunders and
Robinson, 2013). Further, the present findings have important
implications for the treatment of impulse-control disorders.
Overall, these individual differences in PIT offer new insights
into the mechanisms underlying the transition from intentional
to habitual/compulsive behavior.
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